NEW YORK CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENTS

In Campuzano v. Board of Education of the City of New York, JJ Lyons Associates, Inc; Decided on August 12, 2008, The First Department reversed the denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on Labor Law § 240(1) and granted the motion. The facts as set forth in The opinion of The Court were as follows;

“Plaintiff Joaquin Campuzano and a coworker, while performing asbestos abatement work, were removing a heavy duct from a ceiling by cutting it with an acetylene torch. They started this work on a scaffold, but Campuzano determined it was dangerous to work that way, and decided instead to set up a ladder adjacent to the scaffold. While Campuzano was standing on the ladder and holding the hoses for the torch, a portion of the duct fell, hitting him and the ladder and knocking him to the ground.”

In granting plaintiffs’240(1) Motion The Court held;

“Plaintiffs made a prima facie showing that defendants violated Labor Law § 240(1), i.e., failed to provide Campuzano with an adequate safety device, and that the violation was a proximate cause of the accident. Thus, plaintiffs made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on their Labor Law § 240(1) claim (see Kosavick v Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.Y., 50 AD3d 287 [2008]; see also Panek v County of Albany, 99 NY2d 452, 458 [2003]). In opposition, defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether the ladder was an adequate safety device or Campuzano’s own acts or omissions were the sole proximate cause of the accident (see Kosavick, supra; see also Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35, 40 [2004]). In particular, there is no evidence controverting Campuzano’s assertions that the ladder was a safer method of proceeding with the assigned job; that the scaffold was too small for two employees safely to stand on while performing the work; [*2]and that Campuzano was never instructed not to use a ladder in addition to the scaffold. Thus, summary judgment should be granted to plaintiffs on their Labor Law § 240(1) claim.”