Gair, Gair, Conason, Rubinowitz, Bloom, Hershenhorn, Steigman & Mackauf is a New York Plaintiff's personal injury law firm specializing in automobile accidents, construction accidents, medical malpractice, products liability, police misconduct and all types of New York personal injury litigation.

Articles Posted in Construction Accident

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In Salazar v.Novalex Contracting Corp., et al., decided on November 21, 2011, The New York Court of Appeals in a 4-3 decision granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing a construction worker’s 240(1) claim. The plaintiff suffered injury while working in the basement of a building undergoing renovation. The facts of the accident as set forth by Judge Pigott, writing for the majority were in pertinent part, as follows;

“The accident occurred in the largest room of the basement, which had a trench system,for piping. Salazar and the other workmen were laying a concrete floor. They were directed to pour and spread concrete over the entire basement floor, including the trenches. Before he began work on the day he was injured, Salazar looked for, and visuallylocated, the trenches.

The concrete flowed from a truck into wheelbarrows placed in the basement, via a chute fed through a window. Workmen poured the wet concrete from the wheelbarrows onto the floor of the basement, where Salazar and others “pulled” the concrete with rakes, ensuring that the floor would be level. As Salazar explained the next stage of the process at his deposition, the trench system fills with concrete “by itself because the concrete runs and it fills it out . . . the concrete kind of slides down or runs down” into the trenches. Salazar was injured after he stepped into a trench that was partially filled with concrete. He had been walking backwards across the floor, “pulling” concrete with a rake held in front of him, and looking forward, rather than in his direction of motion. As Salazar recalled the incident, “one of the trenches began to fill out with concrete, and at some point when I was pulling, walking backwards, . . . my foot got inside, into that hole.” After Salazar’s right foot hit the bottom of the trench, his right leg folded beneath him. Before being assisted out of the trench by his coworkers, Salazar tried to pull his leg out “on my own, myself, and that’s how I hurt myself.”

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Howard S. Hershenhorn
Howard S. Hershenhorn
Gair Gair Conason
Steigman Mackauf
Bloom & Rubinowitz
Christopher Sallay

Christopher Sallay
Gair Gair Conason
Steigman Mackauf
Bloom & Rubinowitz

 

 

Howard S. Hershenhorn will serve as Overall Planning Chair and Christopher L. Sallay will serve as Assistant Chair of the New York Bar Association‘s Labor Law/Construction Site Accidents in New York Seminar on Friday, December 9, 2011. Anthony H. Gair and Ben B. Rubinowitz will also be speaking at the event. Ben B. Rubinowitz is also the chair of the Long Island seminar.

Friday, December 2, 2011

Melville Marriott Long Island
1350 Old Walt Whitman Road
Melville, NY 11747
(631) 423-1600

Friday, December 2, 2011

Sheraton Syracuse University Hotel
801 University Avenue
Syracuse, NY 13210-0801
(315) 475-3000

Friday, December 9, 2011

New York State Nurses Association
11 Cornell Road
Latham, NY 12110
(518) 782-9400

Friday, December 9, 2011

Affinia Manhattan
371 Seventh Avenue At 31st Street
New York, NY 10001-3984
(212) 563-1800

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In a must read case The New York Court of Appeals in Wilinski v. 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp., et al., decided October 25, 2011, 2011 NY Slip Op 7477, held that;

“Some New York courts have interpreted our decision in Misseritti v Mark IV Constr. Co. (86 NY2d 487 [1995]) to preclude recovery under Labor Law § 240 (1) where a worker sustains an injury caused by a falling object whose base stands at the same level as the worker. We reject that interpretation and hold that such a circumstance does not categorically bar the worker from recovery under section 240 (1). However, in this case, an issue of fact exists as to whether the worker’s injury resulted from the lack of a statutorily prescribed protective device.”

The Court went on to explain Misseritti;

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In a 3-2 decision The New York Appellate Division, 3d Department, in GROVE v. CORNELL UNIVERSITY et al., 75 A.D.3d 718; 904 N.Y.S.2d 559; 2010, denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his 2401(1) claim while granting defendants’ cross motion dismissing the claim holding that plaintiff’s own negligent conduct was, as a matter of law, the sole proximate cause of his injuries. The facts as set forth by the majority were;

“Defendant Cornell University hired defendant Skanska USA Building, Inc. as the general contractor to construct a building on its campus. Skanska subcontracted the window work to Clayton B. Obersheimer, Inc., which employed plaintiff as a glazier. Plaintiff and a coworker, William Sobel, were performing work installing rubber membranes and metal flashing on the second story windows of the building. To reach the windows, plaintiff and Sobel utilized a mechanical telescoping boom lift, as they had done previously. Attached to the boom lift was a metal basket in which plaintiff, Sobel, their tools and materials were situated. Three of the four sides of the basket were enclosed by permanent metal rails. The fourth side was enclosed by a metal gate that opened into the basket to allow for ingress and egress of the workers. The gate was designed with a spring-loaded hinge so as to automatically swing the gate to a closed position when not in use. Plaintiff and Sobel were also provided with safety harnesses and lanyards that were to be attached to the basket to prevent them from falling out of the basket while it was in the raised position. Following a work break and the retrieval of additional materials, plaintiff and Sobel reentered the lift basket and plaintiff began operating the lift, raising it to the second floor. Sobel noticed that plaintiff had not attached the lanyard on his harness to the basket and reminded him to do so. Sobel then began work on a window and, within moments, turned around and saw that plaintiff was gone and the gate was in the open position. Plaintiff fell at least 30 feet, landed on a narrow slab of concrete below and suffered significant injuries”

The majority found that the fact that the spring-loaded hinge was not operating properly did not render the gate defective and that if plaintiff had either attached his lanyard as required or closed and latched the gate manually, the provided safety devices would have prevented him from falling out of the basket. The dissent argued based on BLAKE and DUDA, that once a violation of 240(1) is shown a plaintiff’s conduct can’t be held as a matter of law to be the sole proximate cause of his accident, stating;

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In a 3-2 decision The New York Appellate Division, 1st Department affirmed the granting of summary judgment to a construction worker on his 240(1) claim. In Reavely v.Yonkers Raceway Programs, Inc., et al., decided on October 20, 2011, the worker suffered injury while assisting in the installation of a hang wall at the edge of a building foundation. The pertinent facts as to the happening of the accident were set forth by The Court;

“Approximately 10 minutes before plaintiff approached the wall to make the cut, another contractor had finished installing waterproofing on the surface of the foundation where plaintiff would be doing the work. Plaintiff knew that it ordinarily takes at least 20 minutes for the waterproofing, which is a tar-like, viscous material, to dry. However, he was directed to make the cut immediately and did not want to defy his supervisor by waiting until he could be certain that the surface was safe. Plaintiff tested the material, and it appeared dry enough to stand on, so he commenced his work. As he was completing the cut, he attempted to replant his right foot and slipped on the viscous waterproofing. According to plaintiff’s affidavit submitted in connection with the subject summary judgment motions, “When I slipped I lost my balance. My body was pulled forward and I hovered over the uncovered 10 feet trench edge without fall protection. It was 10 feet deep there because that particular section had not been backfilled. I felt that I was about to go over the edge. I reacted immediately and instinctively to teetering by trying to stand up. I also desperately tried to counter the momentum pulling me over the edge by arching back. I knew that I was holding a potentially lethal saw which I was about to go over ]with, or even worse, on. Worried about hitting my leg as well and in the process of teetering and desperately trying to prevent myself from going fully over the trench edge, my right hand came off the operating saw and it struck my right hand, thumb and forefinger before it dropped.” Thus, according to plaintiff’s uncontested version of events, he did not actually sustain his injury by falling into the trench, but rather by attempting to prevent himself from falling.”

In rejecting the defendants’ attorney’s assertion that plaintiffs’ Labor Law § 240(1) claim should be dismissed because plaintiff did not fall from a height, and no object fell upon him from above it held;

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In a New York construction accident case in which a worker suffered injury when he fell from a scaffold The Court rejected the recalcitrant worker defense. In Mazurett v. Rochester City School District, decided by The New York Appellate Division, 4th Department on October 7, 2011, the construction worker sustained injury when he fell from a collapsing scaffold at a construction site. In affirming the granting of summary judgment for the plaintiff on his 240(1) claim the Court rejected the defense that the plaintiff was a recalcitrant worker whose conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident holding;

“Plaintiffs met their initial burden of establishing a prima facie violation of Labor Law § 240 (1). The fact that the scaffold collapsed “is sufficient to establish as a matter of law that the [scaffold] was not so ‘placed . . . as to give proper protection’ to plaintiff” pursuant to the statute (Dean v City of Utica, 75 AD3d 1130, 1131; see Tapia v Mario Genovesi & Sons, Inc., 72 AD3d 800, 801; see also Cantineri v Carrere, 60 AD3d 1331). In opposition to the motion, defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether plaintiff’s “own conduct, rather than any violation of Labor Law § 240 (1), was the sole proximate cause of his accident” (Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35, 40). We reject defendant’s contention that plaintiff was a recalcitrant worker whose own actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident. Although defendant submitted evidence that plaintiff was instructed to use a more stable scaffold and to use a ladder to ascend the scaffold, defendant failed to submit any evidence that plaintiff refused to use a particular scaffold or ladder that was provided to him. “The mere presence of [other safety devices] somewhere at the work site” does not satisfy defendant’s duty to provide appropriate safety devices (Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 524, rearg denied 65 NY2d 1054; see Williams v City of Niagara Falls, 43 AD3d 1426; Whiting v Dave Hennig, Inc., 28 AD3d 1105, 1106). Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff was negligent, we conclude that his own conduct cannot be deemed the sole proximate cause of the accident inasmuch as plaintiffs established that a statutory violation was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries (see Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280, 290; Calderon v Walgreen Co., 72 AD3d 1532, appeal dismissed 15 NY3d 900).”

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In Schick v. 200 Blydenburgh, LLC, et al., 2d Department decided October 4, 2011, the plaintiff sustained injury when he fell from a ladder on which he was standing. The Court set forth the facts as follows;

“On March 9, 2007, the date of the subject accident, Pal Supply had not yet moved into the premises. That morning, the injured plaintiff (hereinafter the plaintiff), a field technician for Verizon, was assigned to provide telephone service for Pal Supply at the warehouse. According to the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, upon arrival at the warehouse, he discovered that the installation of three telephone lines would involve connecting the terminal located at the telephone pole on the road to an existing underground wire leading to a serving terminal located inside the rear of the warehouse. The plaintiff testified that he thought he would then install the Network Interface Device (hereinafter the NID), which would house the three telephone lines, a few feet from this serving terminal. However, according to the plaintiff, a Pal Supply employee told him to run a wire from the serving terminal along the ceiling to an area above the office doorway, and to install the NID over the doorway.

The plaintiff further testified at his deposition that he installed the cross connection wire from the telephone pole terminal to the underground wire, tested the dial tone at the serving terminal, and attached the wire from the serving terminal along the wall leading from the serving terminal up to the ceiling. The plaintiff attached the wire to existing structural trusses using plastic zip ties, slicing off the tails of the ties with a diagonal cutter. As the plaintiff was attaching the wire to the trusses that were near the ceiling, which were approximately 20 feet high, he felt the ladder on which he was standing shift up and down, the bottom of the ladder slid out, and the plaintiff fell to the floor. The plaintiff alleged that the ladder slipped or shifted due to sand, dirt, or dust on the floor.”

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In Cordeiro v. TS Midtown Holdings, LLC, et al., The New York Appellate Division, First Department on September 15, 2011, granted plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as to liability on their Labor Law § 240(1) claim.

The plaintiff sustained injury while preparing to remove elevator equipment from a building owned and managed by defendants by hoisting it through hatchway doors connecting a motor room with the floor below it. As plaintiff was sliding open the latch to the doors, they unexpectedly opened, causing him to fall to the floor below. Despite the fact that the doors were a permanent fixture of the building The Court in granting the motion and reversing the lower Court held;

“Plaintiffs met their prima facie burden of establishing entitlement to partial summary judgment on their Labor Law § 240(1) claim. Although the doors through which plaintiff fell were a permanent fixture of the building, they were not a “normal appurtenance,” but rather, an access opening specifically built for the purpose of allowing workers to perform their work on the building elevators by hoisting materials to the building’s motor rooms (Brennan v RCP Assoc., 257 AD2d 389, 391 [1999], lv dismissed 93 NY2d 889 [1999]). Accordingly, we find that the hatch in this case was a “device” within the meaning of § 240(1) (see id.; Crimi v Neves Assoc., 306 AD2d 152, 153 [2003]). Further, plaintiff did not step onto hatchway doors that opened accidentally (compare Bonura v KWK Assoc., 2 AD3d 207 [2003], and Rodgers v 72nd St. Assoc., 269 AD2d 258 [2000]). Rather, plaintiff was required to open the doors in order to hoist up the governor from the 19th floor hallway below. This exposed plaintiff to a gravity-related risk of falling into the hallway from the motor room (see Godoy v Baisley Lbr. Corp., 40 AD3d 920 [2007]).”

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This is from a Seminar by The New York State Bar Association on New York Construction Accident Law which was held in 2008. The Seminar was developed by Howard S. Hershenhorn who was the over -all planning chair. The seminar has been held State wide since 2007. It will once again be presented by The New York State Bar Association on December 2, 2011 in Syracuse and Long Island, and December 9, 2011 in Albany and New York City. Further details will be posted.